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INTRODUCTION
The burning of agricultural residues,
particularly rice straw, has long been an
issue of public concern in California's
Sacramento Valley. Especially during
days of autumn temperature inversions,
the smoke in the atmosphere from
burning is regarded by some as a serious
health hazard and by nearly all residents
as a public nuisance. Strong pressures
have resulted in stringent regulations
wer agricultural burning, but a growing
umber of voices advocate a strict
;rohibition on burning.
The prospect of a burning ban is
worrisome to rice growers since burning
is not only the most cost-effective way of
disposing of the straw, but it also destroys
organisms that cause rice diseases,
particularly stem rot. Thus, it is argued
that a ban on burning would reduce rice
yields, increase production costs, and
could threaten the economic viability of
the California rice industry.
However, no one knows the total
economic effects of a burning ban. This
report makes a start in addressing the
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issue. Given what is known about the
expected impacts on rice yields and the
costs of growing and marketing rice
absent residue disposal by burning, what
shifts in rice and competing crops would
occur? How would California farmer
profits be affected? And what losses
would be suffered by consumers from
resulting higher rice prices?
Obviously, factors affecting the
profitability of growing rice in California
are complex and diverse. Especially
critical are the world market for rice and
the current income and price support
policies of the federal government. Both
have shifted significantly in recent years.
Exports of California rice are much lower
than in the 1970s and early 1980s, and
world market prices are also much lower.
Also, rice farmers get a much larger
fraction of their incomes from direct
government payments than they did in
the 1970s and early 1980s. This changing
context means that the burning ban issue
must be considered within a broader
economic and policy framework.

RICE IN THE CALIFORNIA AGRICULTURAL ECONOMY
California produces about 25 percent
of the rice grown in the nation and ranks
second to Arkansas as a rice-growing state
(Rominger, 1986). About half of the
state's production is exported, however.
Approximately 65 percent of the rice
grown in the state is medium grain, 25
percent is short grain, and 10 percent is
long grain (Cook and Moore, 1986).
Among the medium grains are varieties
with very early, early, intermediate, and
late maturities (California Rice Growers,
1984). All are short-statured varieties
with a stem length less than 38 inches at
maturity.
However because more
nitrogen is applied to the semi-dwarf
varieties grown than would be
economically feasible with long-stem
varieties, the total amount of straw
produced is about the same.
In recent years, rice has been
California's third most valuable field
crop after cotton and wheat. In 1984, the
crop produced a gross farm value of $250
million and contributed $91 million to
exports (Cook and Moore, 1986), down
from a peak farm value in 1981 of $418
million and exports of $320 million.
Over 90 percent of the state's
production is located in the Sacramento
Valley.
The most important riceproducing counties, in order of value of
output, are Colusa, Butte, Glenn, Sutter,
Yolo, and Sacramento.
Yields are higher in California than in
other rice-growing states giving
California has an absolute cost advantage
per hundredweight (cwt) at the farm gate
for all three grain lengths, even though
California per-acre costs of production are
higher (Cook and Moore, 1986).
However, assembling, handling and
milling costs are higher in California
than in competing states like Arkansas
and Louisiana, but drying costs are lower
(Wailes and Holder, 1986).
3

Considering all cost aspects, including
transportation costs to market, Cook and
Moore (1986, p. 182) summarize:
California-produced rice can be
competitive in the states west of
the Rocky Mountains; however, on
the other side of the Continental
Divide, our (California) rice is at a
competitive disadvantage. There,
we must rely on carving out a market niche for our medium-grain
rice, looking for a price premium
due to quality, taste, and label
recognition.
Given this tenuous marketing
situation, California rice . producers must
be sensitive to any technology or policy
that will increase their costs and reduce
their competitive position.
Al though California is free from
some of the serious pest problems which
are troublesome in other rice growing
regions, diseases do exist that can reduce
yields significantly (California Rice
Growers, 1984). The most important one
associated with straw burning is stem rot,
a fungus disease that invades the sheath
and stem of the rice plant. Surveys
indicate that stem rot causes a 5 to 8
percent loss in yield.
The organism that causes stem rot
disease overwinters as sclerotia in loose
straw or standing stubble. It floats to the
top when rice fields are flooded in the
spring and invades the rice seedlings.
Burning in the fall, followed by
moldboard plowing, is the most effective
practice in preventing the disease
(California Rice Growers, 1984). Delaying
burning until spring is not as effective,
both because stem rot losses are higher
and because the straw is often not dry
enough to get a good burn. However,
when the fall harvest is late, it is difficult

to burn before the winter rains; then
growers burn in the spring.
Incorporating the straw residue into
the soil significantly increases the
amount of disease the following year.
Removing the straw by cutting the
stubble below the level of stem rot
infection, baling it, and removing the
loose straw can be just about as effective
in controlling disease as burning, but this
alternative is costly.
The Rice Research Board funded
several research projects from 1979 until
1983 in an attempt to find economic uses
for rice straw. Potential uses include feed
for livestock, material for fiberboard,
energy generation, conversion to sugar
syrup and yeast protein, and making pulp
for paper and for various industrial
products (California Rice Growers, 1984).
However, none of these appears to be
economically feasible on a large scale.
The Rice Research Board has also
supported research studies to find ways of
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reducing the quantity of smoke entering
the atmosphere. These studies concluded
that: (1) High moisture content increases
smoke and, therefore, burning when the
straw contains 12 percent or less moisture
is recommended. (2) With clear weather
and straw that has been spread, a field can
be burned three days after harvest. (3)
Burning between 10 a.m. and 5 p.m.
produces the least smoke. (4) Burning
against the wind produces about half as
much smoke as burning with the wind.
By using the appropriate burning
procedures, reductions over preregulated
burning methods can be as much as 80
percent for particulate matter, over 65
percent for gaseous hydrocarbons, and
over 80 percent for carbon monoxide
(California Rice Growers, 1984).
The next section describes the model
used here to analyze the economic
impacts of a burning ban. Some readers
may wish to move directly to sections
reporting results of the analysis.

THE CALIFORNIA AGRICULTURAL RESOURCES MODEL (CARM) 1
CARM is a quadratic programming
model designed to study the intrastate
regional impacts of changes in product
prices and input costs, policies, and
resource constraints on the location,
profitability, and production of the
principal California crops. CARM does
not provide unconditional long-range
forecasts. Rather, it is most useful in
answering "what-if" questions: e.g.,
What might happen in the short term if
"A" occurs? Thus, CARM is intended to
supplement other types of evaluations of
agricultural issues. The model assesses
the economic consequences of specific
scenarios, such as the one under
consideration here, a ban on rice straw
burning. It does not and cannot make
definitive policy judgments.
The maximand in the objective
function is the sum of producer and
consumer surpluses, a standard measure
of net economic welfare.
Producer
surplus, as employed in CARM,
essentially measures the difference
between producer revenues and variable
costs, so it also indicates profitability and
contribution to producer wealth.
Consumer surplus is a measure of the
net benefits captured by consumers as
prices change due to shifts in product
supply. 2

The objective function is quadratic in
revenue and cost because it maximizes
the area between linear demand and
supply curves. The model implicitly
assumes a competitive economic system
where individual consumers and
producers are price takers, i.e., they do
not individually influence the prices of
what they buy and sell.
Linear demand and supply curves
were chosen because they meet a
minimum standard of plausibility
consistent with
a
manageable
computational burden and available data.
The statewide demands correspond to the
market demand curves of a competitive
industry, with the regional supply curves
being associated with price-taking firms
operating within such a system. 3 The
regional cost functions consist of linear
and nonlinear portions, reflecting
increasing costs with rising production of
a given activity. For example, costs
increase when operations expand onto
less suitable lands.
The objective function incorporates
farmers' assumed behavior of generating
an economically efficient product mix at
least cost (given production and market
conditions). Accurate calibration will
occur only when what is optimal from

1 The material in this section is discussed more fully in Howitt and Gardner (1986).
2 It should be explicitly recognized that the important matter of health care costs and even nuisance costs
associated with straw burning are not considered here. Although important, these matters were beyond the
scope of this study. Thus, this analysis must not be construed as a complete welfare analysis of the effects of
a burning ban.
3 This point deserves some elaboration. Even though individual farmers are price takers and face perfectly
elastic demand curves consistent with a perfectly competitive market, the demand curves facing the
aggregate industry at the state level are not perfectly elastic. Therefore, CARM utilizes demand curves
that have some slope, meaning that larger quantities of a commodity can only be sold at a lower price. In
the case of rice, California producers supply a significant portion of rice in the markets they serve,
particularly the export markets. Thus, the assumption of some slope in the demand function is quite
appropriate.
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the farmer's point of view also is
considered optimal from the model's
point of view.
Thus, the positive
quadratic programming methods utilized
in CARM employ declining marginal
revenue functions and replicate farmer
reactions without excessive use of ad hoc
constrain ts.
Howitt and Mean (1985) developed a
method for estimating empirically the
unknown supply relations by calibrating
a base-year cropping pattern without
additional constraints. A rational farmer
maximizes profits by equating price with
rising marginal costs due to declining
marginal physical products and
increasing risks. The combined effects of
these assumptions are implied in the
farmer's crop-allocation decision, and the
model treats these relationships as an
implicit cost function. Then, a second
unconstrained run of the model will
exactly replicate the base-year cropping
pattern.
With the regional crop
constraints relaxed and with quadratic
revenue and cost functions incorporated,
the model will respond to alternative
scenarios in a gradual manner, without
the inbred volatility characteristics of
many linear models.
CARM divides the state into 17
reasonably homogeneous agricultural
production regions (Figure 1). Because
data are available at the county level,
county boundaries are generally followed
except when a more homogeneous
specification is needed. About 94 percent
of the state's rice is grown in Region 5.
The CARM regional data base was
developed from the annual county
agricultural commissioners reports.
Conversion of the data base from a
county to a regional basis involved
estimation of the subcounty crop
distributions for those counties spanning
two or more CARM regions.
The
regional data base included a given crop
if that region produced at least 1 percent
6

of the state total for that crop, or 1,000
acres, whichever was smaller.
The
CARM crop list (Table 1) includes the
significant annual field crops in
California, as well as fruit and nut crops
and important short-term perennials,
such as alfalfa hay and irrigated pasture.
The 47 annual crops included in the
model accounted for roughly 95 percent
of the state's acreage and crop value in
1986.
Table 1.

CARM Crops

Alfalfa Hay
Alfalfa Seed
Almonds
Apples
Apricots
Asparagus
Avocados
Barley-Dryland
Barley-Irrigated
Beans-Dry
Broccoli
Cantaloupes
Carrots
Cauliflower
Celery
Corn-Field
Cotton
Grain Hay
Grain Sorghum
Grapefruit
Grapes-Raisin
Grapes-Table
Grapes-Wine
Lemons

Lettuce
Green Limas-Processing
Nectarines
Oats
Olives
Onions-Dry
Oranges
Pasture-Irrigated
Peaches
Pears
Plums
Potatoes
Prunes
Pistachios
Rice
Safflower
Silage-Corn
Sugar Beets
Tomatoes-Fresh
Tomatoes-Processing
Walnuts

Wheat-Dryland
Wheat-Irrigated

CARM uses arithmetic means of
prices and yields of various crops for each
region, averaged over the years 1973-77,
except for the prices of fruit and nut
crops. Because these crops have more
volatile prices, a 10-year mean was
employed. Cost data were obtained from
cost-of-production sheets developed at
the county level by University of
California Cooperative Extension, and
from crop budgets developed by the UC
Davis Budget Generator program.
Several other sources and expert
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Westlands
North Coast
Delta
South Bay
Sacramento Valley
Mountain Valleys
Central Coast
Northern San Joaquin Valley
Central Coast Interior
Eastside San Joaquin Valley
Southwest San Joaquin Valley
South Coast
High Desert
Imperial
Coachella
Palo Verde
San Diego

personnel were consulted as checks on
these cost data.
Right-hand side supplies of ground
water, nitrogen fertilizer, fuel and labor
were set at levels that ensured sufficient
capacity. Land and ground water stocks
and surface water supplies were
estimated for each region from data
obtained from government agencies,
such as the U.S. Department of
Agriculture Soil Conservation Service
and the California Department of Water
Resources.
The demand equations were
developed and extended from earlier
work by Adams (1979) and King, Adams,
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and Johnston (1978). A set of regression
equations was estimated for each crop,
where price was assumed to be a function
of the real California crop price in 1978
dollars, California production in 1978,
other U.S. production in 1978, real U.S.
disposable personal income in 1978, and
export exchange rates where appropriate.
Most of the time series spanned the
period 1969-1984.
CARM's programming tableau
consists of 300 cropping activities and
uses a nonlinear programming
algorithm suitable for large, sparse
matrices.

THE 1985 FOOD SECURITY ACT AND OTHER RELEVANT MATTERS
The ability of farmers to make
cropping-pattern shifts in response to
changes in crop profitability depends
importantly on whether or not they are
enrolled in government programs.
Enrollment imposes a set-aside
requirement that generally ranges
between 10 and 35 percent of some
historical base acreage. Under the Food
Security Act of 1985 (FSA85), enrollment
rates in California were much higher in
1986 and after, than they were under the
previous farm bill.
A majority of
California farmers growing rice and
cotton participated in federal programs,
attracted especially by some new features
of FSA85. Table 2 reports farmer and
acreage enrollment figures in California
program crops in 1986. Over 85 percent
of the cotton acreage and 90.1 percent of
the rice acreage was enrolled. 4 By 1988
virtually all rice and cotton acres were
under their respective programs.
Table 2.

Percentage of Enrollment In
Commodity Farm Programs In
California, 1986
Farms

Crop
Wheat
Corn
Sorghum
Barley
Oats
Cotton
Rice

Averaae
Percent
29.4
53 .8
22.7
40.7
18.3
34 .9
22.5
46 .8
20.2
36.3
63.9
85.1
80.2
90 .1

These enrolled producers are
guaranteed the equivalent of the original
loan rate as a minimum price for their
program crops. In addition, they receive
a deficiency payment representing the
difference between the target price and
market price or loan rate, whichever is
higher, subject to a payment limitation of
$50,000 per person. No firm data are
available, but it is widely believed that
the payment limitation is circumvented
as farmers approach the limit. Farm
entities are "created" by dividing acreages
among family members or employees in
such a way that each entity may receive
up to the $50,000 payment limit
(Nuckton, 1989). If this is true, then it is
the target price that is guaranteed and
therefore guides planting production
decisions. 5 For this reason, we use the
target price to represent the revenue
received on all units of program crops
produced. For those producers who elect
to stay out of government programs, the
relevant marginal price guiding
production decisions is the expected
market price which varies from year to
year. Market prices utilized in this study
were average annual California prices for
the three years 1984-86, deflated by the
Consumer Price Index. These estimated
1986 market prices and the target prices
for the various program crops are found
in Table 3.

4 Some features of the FSA85 such as the 50/92 provision, Conservation Reserve Program, and the
"sodbuster" and "swampbuster" programs have not been widely used in California and, therefore, will be
ignored in the analysis.
5 Minimum target prices for rice are $11.90 per cwt in 1986, $11.66 in 1987, $11.30 in 1988, $10.95 in 1989, and
$10.71 in 1990. The target deficiency payment rate will be equal to the target price minus the average
market price received by farmers during the first five months of the marketing year, or the loan rate,
whichever is higher.
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Table 3.

Market and Target Prices
Utilized in CARM Analysis of
Rice Straw Disposal
Alternatives

Crop
Barley
Corn
Cotton
Grain Sorghum
Oats
Rice
Wheat

Average
Market Pricea
$2.53/bu
2.93/bu
0.653/lb
2.59/bu
1.92/bu
5.13/cwt
3.42/bu

for available commodities in CCC
inventory. Active markets in certificates
have developed so the holders can
convert them into cash when desired.

1986 Target
Price
$2.60/bu
3.03/bu
0.81/lb
2.88/bu
1.60/bu
11.90/cwt
4.38/bu

a Average of 1984-86 California prices, put in 1986
dollars using the CPI index; prices used were from the
California Crop and Livestock Reporting Service.

If the Secretary of Agriculture
determines the supply of a program crop
is excessive, an acreage reduction
program (ARP), or a paid diversion
program, or both, may be implemented.
For rice, the Secretary must try to apply
ARP such that the carryover will not be
more than 30 million cwt. Acreage
limitations cannot exceed 35 percent of
the rice base acreage. The 35 percent ARP
effective in 1986 is reflected in the acreage
figures programmed by CARM.
Another attractive feature of the
FSA85 was the marketing certificate
program (USDA, 1986). To reduce the
budgetary costs to the federal treasury,
value-in-kind in government stocks
were offered rather than dollar deficiency
payments. Beginning August 1, 1986, the
Commodity Credit Corporation made
loan deficiency payments to rice farmers
in the form of negotiable generic
marketing certificates. Holders could
exchange their
certificates for
commodities which they had pledged as
collateral for a CCC price-support loan or
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Other Relevant Matters
In the Sacramento Valley, soils vary a
great deal. Many of the heavy clay soils
in the region are suitable only for rice.
On the lighter soils, other crops can be
economically substituted for rice as prices
and costs change.
CARM allocates
acreage among crops on the basis of their
economic profi ta bili ty, not their
agronomic suitability, so the latter must
be handled as a constraint on the total
area that can go to substitute crops. After
consulting soil maps of the area, rice and
soils specialists, and published reports, it
was assumed that 40 percent of the soils
in the rice area should be constrained to
growing only rice, or possibly some
irrigated pasture.
Therefore CARM
allocated land only between rice and
pasture on this 40 percent. On the
remaining 60 percent CARM allocated
acreage among the crops on the CARM
list if the profitability criterion so
dictated.
Another matter is the cost of
fallowing land in the event that farmers
rotate fallow in their cropping regime
and/ or enroll in government programs
that require them to set aside a portion of
their base acreage.
Extension farm
ad visors and rice growers in the area
indicated that the annual costs of
maintaining fallow rice land were $45 per
acre. Fallow rice comes into play in the
incorporation-rotation run discussed
below.

ALTERNATIVE RESPONSES TO A BAN ON RICE STRAW BURNING
If a ban on rice straw burning were
imposed, what options do farmers have
for disposing of their straw? Here we
model several alternatives, although it
must be emphasized that none is
considered to be economically feasible on
a broad scale in the rice-growing region.
However, there is some justification for
the selection of the various options and
underlying assumptions.

Run 2: Incorporation and Rotation with
No Change in Rice Yield
If crops are rotated with rice, the stemrot inoculum does not persist, and yields
are not necessarily lower than those
under a straw-burning regime (UC, 1981,
p. 20) A Cooperative Extension farm
adviser working in the region suggested
wheat as the rotating crop followed by
fallow and then rice.

Run 1: Incorporation with No Rotation
and a Resulting Drop in Yields
One way of responding to a burning
ban is to treat the rice crop like many
other small grains and simply plow the
rice straw back into the soil
(incorporation). The most significant
economic effects of incorporation are the
costs of the practice itself and the decline
in yields due to increased incidence of
stem-rot disease. Both may be influenced
by whether or not rice is rotated with
other crops. For the incorporation runs,
a per-acre cost of $26.15 was added to the
cost of production to represent the cost of
chopping the straw with a shear-bar
chopper (University of California, UC,
1981, p. 60).
Experimental studies from a number
of fields in the northern Sacramento
Valley show that, over a nine-year
period, yield losses after soil
incorporation from stem-rot disease
range from eight and 24 percent annually
(UC, 1981, p. 19). Because of this large
range we made two runs: The first (Run
1) assumes a 10 percent decline in rice
yields in Region 5, and the second (Run
la) assumes a 20 percent yield decline
also in Region 5.

Run 3: Straw Disposal Cost Added to
Total Variable Costs
Run 3 assumes that rice farmers bear
the cost of getting the straw off the field
by picking it up, baling, collecting, and
placing it on the roadside where it can be
priced. These costs range between $20
and $25 per ton (UC, 1981, p. 67). 6 The
midpoint of $22.50 per ton was selected
and assuming a 3-ton per acre yield, the
resulting cost would be $67.50 per acre.
This amount was added to the variable
costs of $380 per acre for growing rice in
Region 5 in 1986.
Run 4: Disposal Cost Subtracted from
Total Variable Cost
It is presently highly problematic that
markets will develop for utilizing rice
straw for building materials or in
electrical co-generation, apparently the
most promising alternative. However, a
Massachusetts firm is planning a cogeneration plant near Woodland that
will use rice straw as one of the fuels.
Preliminary discussions about the price
paid for rice straw suggest about $30 per
ton.

6 It is assumed that these costs include the land costs used for storing the straw until it is disposed of.
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Because of the conjectural nature of
this option, particularly considering the
tremendously large quantities of straw
available each year, the model run was
preformed mainly for comparative
purposes. But many factors operate to
change relative costs to rice farmers, so
7

any such favorable development could
produce results similar to those
generated by this run. Accordingly, Run
4 assumes that the disposal cost added to
variable cost in Run 3 is subtracted from
variable cost for Run 4. 7

Subtracting the per acre rice-straw disposal costs from variable cost may be too heroic and, if so, makes
this run more profitable than it should be compared to the base run. The net gains to farmers, compared to
the base run, should be the difference between the revenues they get from the rice straw (approximately
$90 per acre) and what it costs them to remove it (approximately $67.50). The difference ($22.50 per acre)
is less than the removal costs ($67.50). However, if we assume that the farmer is legally obligated to
remove the straw, whether or not a market exists, then the marginal benefits of a market for the straw
would be the entire revenue ($90.00), which is more than the removal cost. Thus, the assumption used here
of substracting only the removal costs ($67.50) from variable cost straddles the two figures ($22.50 and
$90.00) that could have been used, depending on whether or not straw removal was legally mandated.
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RESULTS
Results from the modeling effort will
be presented as follows: (1) acreage shifts
statewide and in Region 5 resulting from
alternative responses following a burn
ban, as represented by Runs 1 through 4;
(2) a breakdown of the rice acreage
response into two categories: (a) that in
government programs and (b) that
acreage which would remain out of
government programs under the various
scenarios; (3) the implied changes in the
rice price under the several runs; (4)
shifts in the use of selected factor inputs
under the four scenarios; and (5) changes
Table 4.

Crop

in producer and consumer surpluses
resulting from the burning ban under the
respective options.

Statewide Acreage Shifts Resulting from
a Burning Ban
The principal anticipated effect of a
ban on rice straw burning would be to
make rice production relatively less
profitable, unless a good market for the
straw developed.
Table 4 reports the modeled statewide
acreage shifts resulting from responses

Statewide Acreage Shifts Attributable to Various Responses to Rice Straw
D lsposal Alternatives a
Run2
Run3
(straw
(incorpor
Run4
Alll 1a
Aul 1
disposal
-ation
(market(yield
(yield
with
cost
able rice
down
down
%
%Chg
Base
%
added) %Chg
straw)
10%)
20%)
Acreage
Chg
Chg rotation)
%Chg
Acreage
Acreage
Acreage
Acreage
Acreage

Alfalfa
1,021,029
Alfalfa Seed
86,740
Almonds
418,204
Apricots
20,515
BarleyDryland
251,510
BarleyIrrigated
180,496
Beans-Dry
158,835
Corn
266,936
Grain Hay
292,227
Grain
Sorghum
27,941
29,944
Oats
PastureIrrigated
974,952
Prunes
69,913
Rice
384,923
Safflower
97,710
Silage-Corn
143,097
186,122
Sugar Beets
TomatoesProcessing 210,683
WheatDryland
186,847
WheatIrrigated
548,896

87,299

252,781

0.6

0.5

86,460

250,516

-0.3

-0 .4

0.3

1,017,240
85,675
417,121
20,340

-0.4
-1.2
-0.3
-0.9

255,606

1.6

242,391

-3.6
-1.1
-0.4
-1.4
-7.3

89,070

2.7

20,573

181,834 0.7

179,794 -0.4

181,410

0.5

183,047

1.4

304,263

4.1

292,227

-0.8

299,922

2.6

267,967
329,732

0.4
12.8

178,488
158,136
263,067
270,904

28,864 3.3
30,496 1.8

27,110
29,646

-3.0
-1.0

28,093
30,192

0.5
0.8

31,428
31,959

12.5
6.7

22,281
26,949

-20.3
-10.0

984,590

1.0

342,490
97,892

-11.0
0.3

955,743
69,668
489,822
97,271
142,508
185,355

-2.0
-0.4
27.3
-0.4
-0.4
-0.4

210,121

-0.3

970,985 -0.4
376,952 -2 .1

4.1

400,528

304,824

187,341

187,610 0.4

a11 acreage changed by 0.3 percent or more crop was included in list.
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-20.8

0.3

188,721

1.0

182,982

-2.1

552,139

0.6

544,558

-0.8

incorporated in the various runs. The
table includes changes in acreage only for
those crops where the percentage change
exceeded 0.3 percent.
Run 4, representing a decrease in the
variable costs of rice production due to
the assumed market demand for straw,
produces the greatest changes in acreage.
Rice acreage increases by 27.3 percent, or
nearly 105,000 acres. Crops giving up
significant acres to rice under this
scenario are grain hay (21,323), irrigated
pasture (19,209), dryland barley (9,119),
grain sorghum (5,660), irrigated wheat
(4,338), corn (3,869), dryland wheat (3,865),
alfalfa (3,789), oats (2,995), irrigated barley
(2,008), almonds (1,083), and alfalfa seed
(1,065). 8
Run 2 (incorporation and rotation)
produces the next largest response in rice
acreage, a 20.8 percent reduction, or a
decline of just over 80,000 acres. The
additional costs imposed by the rotation
regime cuts into the profitability of
growing rice relative to several substitute
crops. Grain hay, barley, and dryland
wheat are the largest acreage gainers.
Run 3 (an increase in the variable
costs of rice production from collecting
and transporting straw to the roadside)
results in a decline of rice acreage of 11.0
Table 5.

percent, or 42,433 acres. Grain hay and
grain sorghum gain significantly in
acreage.
Runs 1 and la (rice straw
incorporation with a 10 percent and 20
percent reduction in rice yield in Region
5, respectively) produce the smallest
responses in rice acreage. Run 1 produces
a 2.1 percent decrease while Run la
increases rice acreage by 4.1 percent
statewide. This unexpected result comes
from the interplay of the relationships
among yield, cost, price, acreage, and
tonnage incorporated in this model.
As rice yields decline, the tonnage of
production on a given acreage declines,
the supply curve shifts to the left, and
rice prices rise. In affecting per acre
revenue, the price rise tends to partially
offset the effect of cost increases due to
the yield decline. In the case of Run 1
where the assumed decline in yield was
10 percent in Region 5, the increased per
cwt revenue (from base $11.90 to $11.96,
or 0.5 percent) was not enough to offset
the increase in unit production costs
(from base $5.12 to $5.89, or 15 percent).
Thus, in the case of Run 1, the relative
profitability of growing rice declined in
Region 5. The slight increases in acreage
in Regions 1, 3, 8, 10, and 11, which were

Statewide Acres, Tonnage, and Yields of Rice-Computer
Runs Base, 1 and 1a

Landin
Rice (acres)
360,101
Base
Run 1 (10% yield loss)
346,904
Run 1a (20% vield loss)
369 023

Percent
Change
from
Base

-0 .037
0.025

Production
(tons)
1,341,375
1,162,822
1 099 689

Percent
Change
from Base
-0.133
-0.180

Yield
(cwVacre)
3 .725
3 .352
2.980

Percent
Change
from
Base

-0 .100
-0.200

8 The results assume that growers remain in the government programs under this scenario in the same
proportions as they were in the base run. In reality, of course, they may opt to get out of the program, in
which case the set-aside acreage could go into rice and other crops. We had no way of appraising the
elasticity of remaining in the government programs given the assumptions of the various scenarios.
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assumed not to be affected by the burning
ban, were swamped by the decreases in
Region 5.
Therefore, rice acreage
declined statewide.
The significant
gainers in acreage in Run 1 were grain
hay and sorghum.
In the case of Run 1 a, however, the
increases in rice acreage in Regions 1, 3, 8,
10, and 11 in response to the higher rice
price were larger than under Run 1.
However, rice acreage also increases in
Region 5 where the proportionate decline
in production was slightly less than the
decline in yield (Table 5). Therefore, a
more extensive planting of stem rotinfested acres was needed to produce the
optimal output. The large yield loss
resulted in a tonnage reduction of 18.0
percent, far larger than the acreage
increase of 2.5 percent (Table 5). The
significant acreage losers statewide in
Run la are pasture and barley.

In summary, what is evident in these
statewide acreage data is that a ban on rice
straw burning will result in substantial
changes in rice acreage due to the
substitution potential between rice and
other crops. As expected, the crops most
affected are pasture and other field crops,
such as barley, wheat, corn, and sorghum.
The crops which have high per-acre
values, such as fruits, nuts, and even
tomatoes and sugar beets, are not
significantly affected.

Region 5 Acreage Shifts Resulting from a
Burning Ban
Recall
that
Region
5
has
approximately 94 percent of the state's
rice acreage. For this reason, model
results for Region 5 should not differ
markedly from the statewide results
(Table 6).
However, some of the

Table 6.

Region 5 Acreage Shifts Attributable to Various Responses to Rice Straw
Dlsoosal Alternatives a
Run2
Run3
Run 4
Run1
Run1a
(incorpor
(straw
(marketa
(yield
(yield
ation
disposal
ble rice
cost
down
down
with
straw)
10%)
20%)
rotation)
added)
Base
Crop
Acreage Acreage ¾Chg Acreage ¾Chg Acreage ¾Chg Acreage ¾Chg Acreage

Alfalfa
Alfalfa Seed
Almonds
Apricots
Barley-Dryland
Barley-Irrigated
Beans-Dry
Corn
Grain Hay
Grain Sorghum
Oats
Pasture- Irrigated
Rice
Safflower
Silage-Corn
Sugar Beets
TomatoesProcessing
Wheat-Dryland
Wheat-Irrigated

69,393
1,184
92,406
1,405
30,043
4,944
49,670
72,691
42,284
11,698
5,772
150,193
360,101
14,972
14,015
45,824

1,278

7.9

1,439
30,364
5,017

2.4
1.1
1.5

61,711 45.9
12,141
3.8
6,601 14.4
153,677
2.3
346,905 ·3 .7

1,168

-1.4

37,877 -10.4
5,676

·1.7

369,023

2.5

75,796
88,761
139,979

1,244

5.0

1,428

1.6

4,990

1.0

55,794 32.0
2.4
11,980
6,323
9.5
1.6
152,589
270,661 -24.8

70,337
1,481

1,475
5.0
31,085
3.5
4.8
5,180
50,211
1.1
74,979
3.1
97,071 129.6
13,105 12.0
8,359 44.8
161,033
7.2
312,088 ·13.3
15,391
2.8
14,187
1.2

89,918
141,808

a11 acreage changed by 1.0 percent or more crop was included in list.
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1.4
25.1

1.3
1.3

¾Chg

67,524
·2.7
588 -50.4
91,109
•1.4
1,193 -15.1
27,957
·6.9
4,470
·9.6
48,592
·2.2
68,253
·6.1
0 -100.0
8,902 ·23.9
1,319 -77.2
128,240 ·14 .6
473,625
31.5
14,120
-5.7
13,672
·2 .4
45,136
·1 .5
75,144
85,457
135,420

-1.0
·3.7
·3.3

percentage shifts within the region are
considerably different from and are
mostly larger than those at the state level.
Table 6 includes acreages for crops that
change by 1 percent or more from the
base run under the various scenarios.
Run 4 (the favorable rice straw
market) projects a large increase in rice
acreage (31.5 percent), while Runs 2 and 3
project sizeable decreases (24.8 percent
and 13.3 percent, respectively). Runs 1
and la show the same anomaly of a
respective decrease and increase in rice
acreage as described above at the
statewide level and for the same reasons.
Crops that fluctuate in acreage to
accommodate the shifts in rice acreage
among the various runs are primarily
pasture, grain hay (which moves sharply
among the runs indicating that it must be
a close substitute for rice in Region 5),
dryland barley, dryland and irrigated
wheat, and corn.
Rice Acreage In and Out of Government
Programs
CARM also divides the government
program crops into acreage that is
expected to be under governmental
support prices and that which is
producing for the free market, receiving
the world market price (Table 7). Table 7
Table 7.

Region 5, Rice Acreage in and
Various Runs
Base 86
Substitutable
Covered by
Acreage
Program
199,424
Not Covered
16,637
Non-Substitutable Covered by
Acreage
Program
132,949
Not Covered
11,091
Total Region 5
Covered by
Rice Acreage
Program
332,373
Not Covered
27,728
Statewide Rice
Acreaqe
384,923

..

also subdivides acreage between that on
which substitute crops can be grown and
that on which only rice (and some
irrigated pasture) can be grown.
Base-year figures indicate that only
about 7.7 percent of the acreage in Region
5 was producing for the free market in
1986. In all runs except 4 (the favorable
rice straw market), the model predicts
that 100 percent of the acreage will be
under government support programs
with the required set-asides. In the Run 4
scenario, however, 26.6 percent of the
acreage under government programs
returns to the free market. The model
predicts that rice becomes so attractive
with marketable rice straw that some
farmers choose to forego government
support payments in order to be free to
plant all the rice acreage they desire.
The Market Price for Rice on the Base
and Other Runs
Table 8 reports model predictions for the
market price for rice under the base runs
and the various alternative scenarios.
All but Run 4 (marketable rice straw)
produce a higher price than in the base
year. In Run 4, rice is so profitable that
more is produced so that the price falls
from $5.13 per cwt in the base year to
$4.97 per cwt, still only a modest decline.

Out of the Government Program, Base Year and
Run 1

Run 1a

Run 2

Run 3

Run 4

191,725
0

213,844
0

162,397a
0

156,909
0

192,663
125,784

155,179
0

155,719
0

108,264b
0

155,179
0

155,179
0

346,904
0

369,023
0

270,661
0

312,088
0

347,841
125,784

376,952

400,528

304,824

342,490

489,822

a1n add1t1on to this acreage in the nee program are 54,132 acres of fallow and 54,132 acres of wheat grown in rotation .
bin addition to this acreage in the rice program are 72,177 acres of fallow in rotation.
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Table 8.

Market Price for Rice In the
Base Year and In Various Runs

Base Year
Run 1 (yield down 1O percent)
Run 1a (yield down 20 percent)
Run 2 (incorporation with rotation)
Run 3 (straw disposal cost added)
Run 4 (mar1<etable rice straw}

Price($/cwt}
$5.13
5 .19
5 .22
5.25
5.19
4 .97

Levels of Selected Input Use for the
Various Runs
CARM also projects the use level of
several inputs: land in crops, labor,
ground water, surface water, nitrogen,
and fuel (Table 9). Except for ground
water, the changes in input use are not
significantly different from the base year.
The percentage changes for Region 5 tend
to be somewhat greater than for the state
as a whole. However, the percentage of
ground water used does change markedly
from the base year in Run 2 (a 22. 9
percent decrease-when rice production
is cut back because of the high cost of rice
straw disposal) and in Run 4 (a 20.9
percent increase-when rice straw can be
profitably marketed). These percentage
figures translate into 529,499 acre-feet less
ground water utilized in Run 2 than in
the base year and 482,637 acre-feet more
in Run 4.
These substantial changes reflect that
rice is a heavy user of water, so when
acreage increases or is cut back ground
water use changes accordingly .9 If rice
became less profitable as in Run 2 (or if
government payments ended) and if the
decrease in rice production persisted,
ground water tables could rise, with the

possibility of water-logged soils and other
drainage problems. However, ground
water could become available for other
uses in the area and possibly for export to
other areas if transfer restrictions were
removed. The opposite situation would
hold if rice profitability increased as in
Run 4 and the favorable conditions were
to persist over time. Ground water tables
would then be drawn down, pumping
costs would increase, and eventually-if
additional surface water were not
available-profitable agriculture could
not be sustained without controls on
ground water use. Such controls would
then change the cropping patterns and
the agricultural economy of the region.
Note that surface water utilization
does not change from the base year in the
various runs. This is not surprising in
that surface water use is tightly controlled
by legal and administrative rules that
establish water rights and contracts.
When demand for water shifts, it is
usually ground water that takes up the
slack. Model results confirm this.
Model Changes in Producer and
Consumer Surpluses
In many ways the bottom line of the
analysis is what might happen to the
agricultural economy of the region and
state if a ban on straw burning were to
occur. Much depends on what happens
to farmer incomes, which in turn has
linkages to the products which farmers
buy and sell. CARM calculates changes
in what is known as "producer surplus,"

9 A reviewer pointed out that 90 percent of California rice uses surface water from both federal and state
projects and thus shifts in rice acreage may not produce the changes in ground water utilization indicated by
the CARM results. The authors question this conclusion. The marginal costs of using surface water are lower
than pumping ground water. Therefore, surface water supplies will likely be utilized first and ground
water will be considered "residual," satisfying demands after surface supplies have been exhausted. Thus,
shifting acreages of crops which have disparate water demands will shift utilization of ground water just
as CARM assumes. Experience with droughts in the area, when ground water utilization expanded
sharply, confirms this view.
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Table 9.

Levels of Selected Input Use in Base Year and for Various Runs-Region 5 and Statewide

Crop

......

00

Land Used
(1000 acres)
Region 5
State
Labor Used
(1000 hours)
Region 5
State
Ground Water Used
(1000 acre-feet)
Regions
State
Surface Water Used
(1000 acre-feet)
Region 5
State
Total Water Used
(1000 acre-feet)
Region 5
State
Nitrogen Used
(1000 tons)
Region 5
State
Fuel Used
(1000 dollars)
Region 5
State

Base Year

Run 1 (yield
down 10%)
Predicted

%Chg

Run 1a (yield
down 20%)
Predicted

Run 2 (incorporation
with rotation)
%Chg
Predicted
%Chg

Run 3 (straw
disposal cost
added)
Predicted
%Chg

Run4
(marketable rice
straw)
Predicted

%
Chg

1,716,983
9,367,153

1.4
0.2

1,716,983
9,376,153

1.4
0.2

1,716,983
9,367,153

1.4
0.2

1,716,983
9,367,153

1.4
0.2

-1.1
-0.1

27,630,058
383,263,106

-2.4
-0.2

27,259,275
382,918,333

-3.7
-0.3

28,308,259
384,021,134

0.0
0.0

29,010,917
381,375,650

2.4
0.2

2,280,523
10,903,654

-1 .4
-0.1

2,362,386
10,979,333

2.1
0.6

1,784,291
10,411,705

-22 .9
-4.6

2,160,336
10,801 ,960

-6.6
-1 .1

2,796 ,427
11 ,392,818

20 .9
4.3

3,060,000
18,013,688

3,060,000
18,018,878

0.0
0.0

3,060,000
18,015,392

0.0
0.0

3,060,000
18,023,943

0.0
0.1

3,060,000
18,006,146

0.0
0.0

3,060,000
17,977,221

5,373,790
28,932,653

5,340,523
28,225,533

-0.6
0.0

5,422,386
28,994,724

0.9
0.2

4,844,291
28,435,648

-9.9
-1.7

5,220,336
28,808,106

-2 .9
-0 .4

5,856,427
29,370,039

9.0
1.5

72,365
405,537

73,002
406,282

0.9
0.2

72,591
405,822

0.3
0.1

68,178
401,565

-5 .8
-1.0

73,617
406,729

1.7
0.3

74,538
407,431

3.0
0.5

34,826,140
210,680,015

34,317,880
210,274,653

-1.5
-0.2

34,099,760
210,767,787

-2.1
-0.3

32,303,400
208,307,239

-7.2
-1.1

34,314,260
210,310,142

-1.5
-0.2

37,194,674
212,912,766

6.8
1.1

1,693,872
9,344,042

1,716,989
9,367,158

28,320,771
383,954,999

27,999,798
303,664,992

2,313,790
10,918,965

1.4
0.2

'

0.0
-0 .2

which in essence represents changes in
net income (revenues less the
opportunity costs of production). The
model also calculates changes in
"consumer surplus," which represents
the consumers' marginal valuations for a
commodity above what they must pay for
it. Table 10 reports producer surplus in
Region 5 and for the state, and the
statewide combined producer and
consumer surpluses.
Region 5 rice farmers lose over $19.3
million in producer surplus under the
conditions associated with Run 1 (10
percent yield loss) compared to the baserun conditions. Statewide, the loss is
slightly less at about $19.1 million, for
there are additional substitution
possibilities at the state level that would
reduce producer losses. The sharper yield
losses (i.e., 20 percent) associated with
Run la increases the producer surplus
losses suffered by rice farmers to over
$31.8 million in Region 5 and over $31.5
million statewide.
The crop rotation scenario (Run 2) has
producer surplus losses approximating
those of Run 1 with $18.8 million in
Region 5 and $18.4 million statewide. In
Run 3, where disposal costs are borne by
the farmers, the loss is $22.1 million in
Region 5 and $21.85 million statewide.
But rice farmers gain producer surplus
Table 10.

under conditions of Run 4 when they are
paid for their rice straw. The gains are
$27.3 million in Region 5 and $26.8
million statewide.
A better perspective can be obtained by
calculating the changes in producer
surplus per acre of rice grown. In Run 1,
for example, with 346,904 acres of rice, the
$19.3 million loss of producer surplus
amounts to $43.20 per acre. A rice farmer
with 1,000 acres of rice would lose some
$43,204, not an inconsequential sum. If
such losses in producer surplus occurred,
there would be a sharp reduction in
farmer wealth as land values would fall.
Of course, the opposite conclusions
would hold for Run 4 (marketable rice
straw) where gains in producer surplus
occur.
When rice prices fall, ceteris paribus,
rice farmers lose producer surplus; but
lower prices mean gains in surplus for
consumers. Producer and consumer
surpluses also change for all the
substitute crops. Table 10 shows the
combined effects on all producers and
consumers from changes in rice and
other crops in the various scenarios.
Run 1 has a combined loss of $21 million;
Run la, $35 million; Run 2, $20 million;
Run 3, $22 million; and Run 4 a
combined gain of $28 million.

Region 5 and Statewide-Producer and Consumer Surplus In Base Year and
for Various Runs
Region 5 Rice
Producer Surolus

---------------Base
Run 1 (yield down 10 percent)
Run 1a (yield down 20 percent)
Run 2 (incorporation with rotation)
Run 3 (straw disposal cost added)
Run 4 (marketable rice straw)

$169,191
149,877
137,323
150,349
147,095
196,466
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Statewide Rice
Producer Surolus
thousands
$176,020
156,944
144,474
157,638
154,170
202,825

Statewide Consumer
Producer Surplus

$6,434,000
6,413,000
6,399,000
6,414,000
6,412,000
6 462 000

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
This study analyzes the effects of a ban
on burning rice straw in the principal
rice-growing area of California. The
California Agricultural Resources Model
is utilized to project the effects of a ban
on acreage, tonnage, and prices on rice
and various other crops and on producer
and consumer surpluses.
Five
alternative responses that farmers might
make to a burning ban are considered: (1)
incorporating the straw in the soil with
an assumed rice yield reduction of 10
percent, (la) incorporating with an
assumed rice yield reduction of 20
percent, (2) rotating rice with fallow and
wheat with no reduction in rice yields, (3)
removing straw from the field with
farmers bearing the removal costs, and
(4) removing straw from the field with
farmers receiving $30 per ton for the
straw.
The principal findings of the
modeling effort are:
• In all runs except 4, the model
predicts that all of the rice acreage
in the state will be grown under
the government price support
program. However, under Run 4,
because of the very favorable per
acre returns assumed and the high
opportunity costs associated
acreage set-asides required for
participation in the government
programs, 26.6 percent of the rice
acreage returns to the free market.
• At the statewide level, a ban on
rice straw burning in Region 5 can
be expected to reduce the acreage in
rice in Runs 1 (2.1 percent), 2 (20.8
percent), and 3 (11 percent), but
will increase it in Runs la (4.1
percent) and 4 (27.3 percent).
Model results show that rice
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acreage varies substantially under
the assumptions of the various
runs due to the substitution
possibilities of rice with other
crops. Those most affected are
pasture and other field crops such
as barley, wheat, corn, and
sorghum. The large increase in
rice acreage in Run 4 is associated
with corresponding reductions in
acreage of grain hay, irrigated
pasture, and dryland barley. The
rice acreage decline in Run 2 is
associated with corresponding
increases in grain hay, barley, and
dryland wheat. High value per
acre crops such as fruits, nuts, and
tomatoes, are not significantly
affected.
Note, however, that
Runs 1 and la are the most likely
to actually occur, that the projected
effects on rice acreage and on other
crops are not large under those
assumptions.
• The demand functions facing
California growers are sufficiently
elastic that acreage shifts among
the various crops have little effect
on market prices.
• In Region 5, land in crops, labor,
surface water, nitrogen, and fuel
utilized are not materially affected
by the ban on rice straw burning,
and existing supply conditions can
easily accommodate any shifts in
demand. However, ground water
is one input that must be carefully
monitored if a burning ban is
imposed. Ground water demand
is significantly affected by cropping
patterns, and especially rice
acreage. Were rice acreage to
substantially decline, the demand
for ground water would decline

and water tables in the area would
rise, potentially creating drainage
problems. On the other hand,
were rice acreage to increase in the
face of a very profitable market for
rice straw, ground water tables
would fall and pumping costs
would increase.
• Even though acreage shifts may
not be large under the most likely
scenarios (1 and la), changes in
producer and consumer surpluses
could be significant. Per unit costs
of producing rice would rise
significantly if a ban on straw
burning were imposed and rice
farmers would lose between $19.3
million (Run 1) and $31.5 million
(Run la) if incorporation is
practiced. If rotation of rice with
fallow and wheat is practiced, the
loss in producer surplus in Region
5 would be $18.8 million,
indicating that this might be the
least costly way for farmers to
respond to a burning ban.
• When changes in consumer
surplus for California crop
consumers are added to producer
surplus, changes in the economic
cost varies between $20 million
(Run 2) and $35 million (Run la).
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Of course, producers and
consumers gain in the unlikely
event that a vigorous market
develops for rice straw in the
Region 5 area.
The analysis showed that a ban on rice
straw burning will be costly to growers in
the main rice growing regions. If no
adjustments in crop rotation are made,
regional average returns to land and
management for producers will drop by
19 percent (Run la). However, if shifts in
rotations are adopted, the cost to
producers can be reduced by over a third,
to an 11 percent drop in returns.
Producers bear 94 percent of the costs of a
burning ban, and given the current
market, are only able to pass on six
percent of the impact to rice consumers.
Under the enrollment levels and
program provisions in the 1986 base year,
no savings in government program
payments are predicted from the changed
rice acreage.
The $20 million annual cost of a ban,
using the least cost rotational alternative,
should be weighed against the
unintended health and aesthetic losses
from lower air quality due to rice straw
burning.
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